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Prophet inequality for bipartite matching:
merits of being simple and non adaptive
NICK GRAVIN, ITCS, Shangai University of Finance and Economics
HONGAO WANG, Nanyang Technological University
We consider Bayesian online selection problem of a matching in bipartite graphs, i.e., online weighted match-
ing problem with edge arrivals where online algorithm knows distributions of weights, that corresponds to
the intersection of two matroids in Kleinberg and Wienberg [KW12] model. We consider a simple class of
non adaptive vertex-additive policies that assign static prices to all vertices in the graph and accept each
edge only if its weight exceeds the sum of the prices of the edge’s endpoints. We show existence of a vertex-
additive policy with the expected payoff of at least one third of the prophet’s payoff and present gradient
decent type algorithm that quickly converges to the desired vector of vertex prices. This improves the adap-
tive online policy of [KW12] for the intersection of two matroids in two ways: our policy is non adaptive and
has better approximation guarantee of 3 instead of previous guarantee of 5.82 against the prophet. We give
a complementary lower bound of 2.25 for any online algorithm in the bipartite matching setting.
1 INTRODUCTION
The topic of prophet inequality broadly refers to the study of trade offs between online and of-
fline selection algorithms in Bayesian settings. The first fundamental result is due to Krengel
and Suncheon [KS77], who considered the following problem in the optimal stopping theory. Let
X1, . . . ,Xn be a sequence of independent, non-negative random variables with E[Xi ] < +∞, then
there is an online stopping policy τ such that
2 · E [Xτ ] ≥ E
[
max
i
Xi
]
. (1)
I.e., if a gambler plays a sequence of games with rewards X1, ...,Xn and who can stop at any
time and take the most recent reward, then a prophet who can foretell which reward to take
in the whole sequence cannot gain more than two times the reward of the gambler. In fact, it
was later shown by Samuel-Cahn [SC84] that a simple stopping policy with a uniform threshold
c : τ = argmini (Xi ≥ c) gives the same approximation guarantee of 2.
In computer science terms, inequality (1) compares the performance of online algorithm (the
gambler) and offline optimal solution (the prophet) in the competitive analysis framework. The
inequality (1) became one of many results in the Bayesian settings where the algorithm has to
select a feasible subset of elements from a random sequence of samples with the knowledge about
the distribution from which this sequence is generated and where the value of the selected set is
compared to the offline optimum solution with the complete information about the sequence of
samples. For example, a general result of this type is due to Kleinberg andWeinberg [KW12], who
gave a 4k−2 competitive algorithm for the Bayesian selection problemwhere feasibility constraint
on the element sets that can be selected is given by the intersection of k matroids.
The interest in prophet inequalities as a tool for the design and analysis of algorithms has
been largely driven by important applications in algorithmic mechanism design. In particular, the
work in Bayesian mechanism design showed a remarkable power of simple sequential posted price
mechanisms (SPM) in a variety of allocation problems such as the settings with unit-demand bid-
ders [CHMS10],[Ala14] and combinatorial auctions [FGL15],[DFKL17]. An underlying environ-
ment for all these applications is matching in bipartite graphs.
Matching. In this paper, we adopt the general stochastic model of Kleinberg and Wein-
berg [KW12] to study an important basic setting of Bayesian (weighted) matching. Specifically,
Nick Gravin and Hongao Wang 2
we assume that edges of a bipartite graph are the elements of our online selection problem which
arrive in an arbitrary order with random values (often called weights) sampled independently
from different probability distributions on R+. An online algorithm knows the distribution of each
edge’s value but could only select a subset of edges that must form a matching. Upon arrival of
every new edge the algorithm observes edge’s value and must immediately decide whether to add
this edge if possible to the current matching or not. The algorithm’s objective is to maximize the
total value of the selected edges.
This model is more general than the matching (unit-demand) models or sequential posted prices
from the mechanism design literature. Indeed, the previous work assumes that one part of the bi-
partite graph is already present and when a new vertex of the other side arrives all the values of its
incident edges are revealed to the algorithm1. On the practical side, the model with edge arrivals
(as opposed to vertex arrivals) gives much finer control over preferences of the agents which may
dynamically evolve over time. On the negative side, the online policy proposed in [KW12] is not
as simple as in [SC84] and is highly adaptive2 to the online information revealed to the algorithm,
i.e., the value thresholds for accepting the elements are constantly changing throughout the algo-
rithm’s execution.
Non adaptivity and simplicity. Indeed, all application of prophet inequality in mechanism design
starting with the work of Hajiaghayi [HKS07] and Chawla et al. [CHMS10] rely on non adaptive
versions of prophet inequality rather than the comparison between optimal online and offline
solutions. E.g., [CHMS10] refers to the result of Samuel-Cahn [SC84] that uses simple and robust
constant threshold policy c but not the earlier version of Krengel and Suncheon [KS77] which
compares the optimal online and offline policies, while Feldman et al. [FGL15] use static item prices
that never change throughout the execution of their algorithm and still obtain tight approximation
guarantee of 2 in Bayesian combinatorial auctions. Therefore, it is much desirable to have prophet
inequalities with non adaptive and simple threshold policy.
Our results. In this paper, we prove a non adaptive prophet inequality for the Bayesian bipartite
matching setting. Our online algorithm belongs to a natural class of simple vertex-additive thresh-
old policies: (i) vertices on either side of the graph receive threshold values l = (l1, . . . , ln) for the
left hand side and r = (r1, . . . , rm) for the right hand side vertices (ii) the online algorithm accepts
every edge e = (i, j) that can be added to the current matching if v(e) ≥ li + r j . We find a vertex-
additive policy with the expected payoff of at least one third of the prophet’s payoff (the expected
value of the optimal matching), i.e., we give a 3 approximation guarantee. We give a complemen-
tary lower bound of 2.25 that shows clear separation from the setting where vertices from one side
arrive online and where the upper bound is 2 (see, e.g., [FGL15]).
The design of our algorithm and its analysis consist of two stages. First, we combine the ideas
from [KW12] and [FGL15] of the additive threshold structure and their accounting of online algo-
rithm expected payoffwith respect to the offline optimum.Generally, we follow the plan of [KW12]
but instead of the element’s (edges) contribution to the optimum we work in a “dual space” of ver-
tices similar to item prices in [FGL15], but applied to the both sides of the bipartite graph. Surpris-
ingly, our non adaptive pricing scheme actually works in Bayesian matching setting and would
1To be fair, the independence assumption (for all edges) of Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12] is a bit stronger than in some
mechanism design models with vertex arrivals. However, without this assumption, it is impossible to recover constant
fraction of the prophet’s value if the algorithm only sees only one edge at a time.
2Although, adaptivity does not preclude Kleinberg and Weinberg’s result to translate into a posted price mechanism for
unit-demand multi-parameter bidderswho report all their preferences at once, it makes it hard to apply to dynamic settings
where valuations of the bidders may dynamically evolve over time.
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immediately yield a simpler algorithmwith the same performance guarantee of 63 as in [KW12] for
the intersection of two matroids. However, a simpler form of the thresholds allows us to improve
the approximation guarantee.
In the second stage, we turn the optimization problem of vertex prices into a bilinear algebraic
form instead of using existing explicit solutions for the additive thresholds from the prior litera-
ture. We further guess that certain vectors of parameters given implicitly as a solution to a semi-
linear system of equations should yield significantly better approximation guarantee of 3. We then
present a gradient-decent type algorithm that quickly finds a solution to this system of equations.
1.1 Related Work
Starting with the work of Krengel and Sucheston [KS77] there has been a lot of work studying
different restrictions on stopping rules, distributions, independence assumption etc., which is too
broad to discuss in this amount of space. We recommend [HK92] for a detailed survey. The line
of earlier work [Ken85, Ken87, Ker86] on multiple-choice prophet inequalities, where the online
algorithm and the prophet can choose more than one element, is particularly relevant to our paper.
In computer science literature, the research on prophet inequalities and their applications to
posted price mechanisms was initiated by Hajiaghayi et al. [HKS07]. Prophet inequalities were
obtained for a variety of multiple choice combinatorial settings: for matroid and intersection
of matroids [KW12, AKW14, FSZ16], polymatroids [DK15], the generalized assignment prob-
lem [AHL12, AHL13], and general downward closed feasibility constraints [Rub16]. In algorithmic
mechanism design, Chawla et al. [CHK07] developed approximately optimal in terms of revenue
posted price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers. Other results on Bayesian auctions with the ob-
jectives of revenue and welfare maximization include [CHMS10, Ala14, CEFF16] for unit-demand
buyers, and [Ala14, FGL15, DFKL17, RV17] for combinatorial auctions. A direct connection be-
tween pricing mechanisms and prophet inequalities is shown in [CFPV19]. The success story of
prophet inequality in mechanism design applications have instigated further studies of dynamic
posted prices in other online optimization settings such as k-server [CEFJ15], and makespan min-
imization for scheduling problems [FFR17].
Online matching. Our matching setting is closely related to online bipartite matching prob-
lem introduced by Karp et al. [KVV90] which is a central topic in the area of online algorithms
with a wide range of applications. In this model one side of the bipartite graph is given in ad-
vance, while the vertices of the other side arrive online in an arbitrary order. The online algo-
rithm observes all edges incident to the arriving vertex, however the algorithm does not have
any prior information about distribution of the edges (typically in this line of work edges have
only 0 − 1 weights). Karp et al. gave tight 1.58 approximation guarantee for the adversarial or-
der of vertex arrivals. The result was extended to the settings with weighted vertices [AGKM11]
and Adword problem [MSVV07]. The latter problem considers generalized matching where each
edge has a weight and each vertex in the given side of the graph has a budget (capacity con-
straint). Earlier work [MSVV07, BJN07] on Adword problem focused on worst-case performance
guarantees for the adversarial or random arrival order [GM08, DH09]. More recent papers con-
sider Bayesian setting in which distribution of weights (bids) usually are known in advance,
e.g., [FMMM09, MY11, KMT11, MGS11, HMZ11, HMZ11, MGZ12, DJSW19]. A few papers con-
sider matching models closer to our edge arrival setting. E.g., McGregor [McG05] gave a 5.82-
competitive online algorithm for (weighted) edge arrivals with preemption, i.e., where the online
algorithm can discard any previously matched edges. Later, improved approximation guarantees
were obtained for randomized algorithms [ELSW13] and for special cases of growing tree and
3In fact, one can give a slightly better approximation guarantee of 5.82 as in [KW12] for the intersection of 2 matroids.
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forests [CTV15, BST17]. A very recent line of work [HKT+18, ABJS18, HPT+19] considers fully
online matching model in (unweighted) bipartite graphs where vertices of both sides arrive on-
line revealing edges to all previously arrived vertices. In this model [HPT+19] gave tight 1.76-
competitive algorithm.
Closest to our work is the result of Kleinberg and Weinberg [KW12] who obtained 4p − 2-
approximation prophet inequality for the online Bayesian selection problem from the intersec-
tion of p matroids. In comparison, our work can be seen as specialization of their result to an
important setting of matching in bipartite graphs that corresponds to the intersection of p = 2 ma-
troids. In this setting, which is arguably considered to be central for the area of online algorithms,
we design much simpler non-adaptive policy with significantly better approximation guarantees
than the guarantee of 6 (5.82) from [KW12]. In terms of techniques, we first combine approaches
from [KW12] and [FGL15] to derive a clean mathematical formulation, which we then efficiently
tackle using novel techniques that may be useful in other stochastic settings.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let G(L,R) be a bipartite multi-graph between the left and the right parts L,R with |L| = n and
|R | = m vertices. The graph has a set of multi-edges E between L and R with different values
ve ∈ R+ for each edge e ∈ E, where R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. The edges
arrive online in an unknown order σ = (e(t))t=Tt=1 , where edges are enumerated by their arrival
time from 1 toT = |E |. For a given profile of values v = {ve }e ∈E , we let opt(v) to denote the value
of the maximal (offline) matching in the graphG with edge values v.
Bayesian online selection problem. We consider a Bayesian setting, where edge values are drawn
independently from the distributions {Fe }e ∈E . Write F =
∏
e ∈E Fe , so that joint valuation profile
v of all edges is drawn from the joint distribution v ∼ F . Both the graphG and the distribution F
are known in advance. An input to the Bayesian online selection problem (BOSP) is a sequenceσ of
pairs (e(t),ve (t ))
t=T
t=1 revealed one by one from time t = 1 to t = T . An online selection algorithm (also
called online policy)A4 upon receiving a new piece of input (e(t),ve (t )) at time t must irrevocably
decide whether to take the edge e(t) subject to the feasibility constraint that the selected set of
edges must form a matching. The goal of the online algorithmA is to maximize the total value of
the selected edges in expectation over v ∼ F .
Every online policy at each time τ ∈ [T ] may be described as a function of the past selection
decisions (not the edge values), since the posterior distribution of values and feasibility constraint
for the edges coming after time τ (for a fixed sequence of past decisions) do not depend on the
realized values before time τ . We use A(v,σ ) to denote the set of all edges accepted by an online
selection algorithmA. When it is clear from the context, we sometimes will drop the dependency
on the arrival order σ . Without loss of generality, one may restrict attention tomonotone selection
policies, i.e., policies that for any given history before time τ select the edge e(τ ) with higher
probability for larger values of ve (τ ). It means that any monotone deterministic selection policy
can be described by a sequence of thresholds (δτ (σ , v))
τ=T
τ=1 , where each threshold δτ only depends
on the prior history (ve (t ))
τ−1
t=1 , such that edge e(τ ) is accepted if and only if ve (τ ) ≥ δτ and neither
of vertices i, j incident to e(τ ) = (i, j) was covered by previously selected edges.
Approximation guarantees. The algorithm A is agnostic to the order of edge arrivals, that is
A should perform well regardless of the arrival order of the edges. We study performance of
A in the worst-case for a fixed-order adversary which is the standard assumption in the prior
4The algorithm A can be randomized, but it must be independent of the randomness (if any) in the choice of σ . Any
randomized algorithm is a distribution over deterministic policies.
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work on BOSP. Formally, we assume that an adversary selects the order σ of edge arrivals (or
distribution of different orders) that does not change with the choices of algorithm and/or realized
edge values. As the optimal solution is usually quite complex even in the most basic settings, the
performance of the online policy A is compared against a stronger benchmark of the expected
prophet’s performance who knows all the realized values v in advance before selecting any edges,
i.e., the benchmark is the offline optimum solution. Prophet inequality refers to the approximation
guarantee of ρ that online algorithm can achieve compared to the prophet, i.e., for any arrival
order σ
ρ · E
v∼F

∑
e ∈A(v,σ )
ve
 ≥ Ev∼F [opt(v)] .
3 ONLINE ALGORITHM
Our algorithm belongs to a natural class of simple non-adaptive threshold policies that we call
vertex-additive policies. Any vertex-additive policy (denoted as V-add) is described by two positive
real vectors l = (l1, . . . , ln) and r = (r1, . . . , rm) that accepts a new arriving edge e(t) = (i, j) with
value ve (t ) if and only if
(1) vertices i, j are available, i.e., both i ∈ L, j ∈ R are not covered by previously accepted edges;
(2) edge’s value exceeds the sum of its vertex thresholds ve (t ) ≥ li + r j .
If at least one of the previous two conditions fails, then the edge e(t) is rejected. The class of vertex-
additive policies bears certain resemblance to the solution proposed in [KW12] for the intersection
of k matroids set systems, but has some important distinctions.
3.1 Analysis of vertex-additive policies
We assume that incoming edges (e(t))t=Tt=1 of graph G arrive in a fixed order σ , which is un-
known to us. Similar to the previous literature on the prophet inequality in the strategic settings
(e.g. [CHMS10, FGL15]), we treat the total value of the accepted edges as the social welfare that
is comprised of two components: (i) the revenue part that is equal to the sum of accepted edges’
thresholds, i.e., the total payment received by the algorithm if it takes from each accepted edge
a price equal to its threshold; (ii) the surplus part, which is equal to the sum of extra values that
every accepted edge contributes to the total value on top of its guaranteed threshold payment. In
particular, we will use price terminology interchangeably with thresholds when referring to our
vertex-additive policy. In the following we will analyze separately the revenue and surplus parts
of any vertex-additive policyA = V-add(l, r). To simplify notations we useA(v) to denote the set
of accepted edges for a particular run of V-add(l, r) on the valuation profile v.
Revenue. The important property of the vertex-additive prices is that we can conveniently at-
tribute the expected revenue of our policy (denoted as Rev) to the average set of covered vertices
instead of the set of accepted edges. We denote the final set of covered vertices ofA(v) for a given
valuation profile v asX (v) that consists of the setsX
L
(v) vertices in the L part ofG andX
R
(v) vertices
in the R part ofG . The expected revenue can be written as follows.
Rev = E
v

∑
(i, j)∈A(v)
(
li + r j
) = Ev

∑
i ∈X
L
(v)
li +
∑
j∈X
R
(v)
r j
 (2)
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Surplus. We can give a lower bound on the expected surplus using the edges between uncovered
vertices of V-add(l, r). The expected surplus (denoted as Surplus) by definition is equal to
Surplus
def
= E
v

∑
e (t )∈A(v)
e (t )=(i, j)
[
ve (t ) − li − r j
]
+
 , (3)
where
[
ve (t ) − li − r j
]
+
denotes max{(ve (t ) − li − r j ), 0}. Since our goal is to compare the surplus
with the optimal matching selected by the prophet, we focus on the edges in the optimal match-
ing opt(̂v), i.e., the optimal matching for another independently drawn valuation profile v̂ ∼ F .
Specifically, our lower bound will include all the edges in a random optimal matching opt(̂v) be-
tween uncovered vertices for the valuation profiles v. To deal with specific edges of the optimal
matching opt(̂v) we employ indicator random variable I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
for the event that there is an edge
e(t) ∈ opt(̂v) between vertices i ∈ L, j ∈ R and random variable χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v):
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v)
def
=
{
v̂e (t ) if ∃e(t) ∈ opt(̂v) s.t. e(t) = (i, j),
0 if (i, j) < opt(̂v)
I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
def
=
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ opt(̂v),
0 if (i, j) < opt(̂v).
(4)
Lemma 3.1. The expected surplus is at least
Surplus ≥ E
v

∑
i<X
L
(v)
j<X
R
(v)
[
E
v̂
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v)
]
− (li + r j ) E
v̂
[
I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
] ]+
, (5)
where Ev̂[I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
] can be also written as Prv̂[(i, j) ∈ opt(̂v)].
Proof. To analyze performance of a vertex-additive policy V-add(l, r), we consider another in-
dicator random variable I
i, j
free
(v, t) of v ∼ F that indicates whether vertices i ∈ L, j ∈ R are free to
take (not yet covered) on the valuation profile v right before the arrival of the edge e(t) at time t .
The surplus of V-add is given by (3) which we further rewrite and bound as follows
Surplus = E
v

∑
i ∈L
j∈R
∑
t :e (t )=(i, j)
[
ve (t ) − li − r j
]
+
· I
i, j
free
(v, t)

= E
v, v̂

∑
i, j
∑
t :e (t )=(i, j)
[
v̂e (t ) − li − r j
]
+
· I
i, j
free
(v, t)

≥ E
v, v̂

∑
i, j
∑
t :e (t )=(i, j)
[
v̂e (t ) − li − r j
]
+
· I
i, j
free
(v,T + 1)
 , (6)
where the second equality holds, since the indicator function I
i, j
free
(v, t) does not depend on ve (t )
and thus is independent of the value of
[
ve (t ) − li − r j
]
+
which we substituted with another in-
dependent and identically distributed random variable
[
v̂e (t ) − li − r j
]
+
; and the inequality holds
simply because I
i, j
free
(v, t) is a decreasing function in time t5. We note that the right hand side (RHS)
5Time T + 1 denotes the time after arrival of the last edge.
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of (6) can be directly related to the sets of covered vertices X
L
(v) ,X
R
(v).
RHS(6) = E
v

∑
i<X
L
(v),
j<X
R
(v)
∑
t :e (t )=(i, j)
E
v̂
[ [
v̂e (t ) − li − r j
]
+
]
≥ E
v

∑
i<X
L
(v),
j<X
R
(v)
E
v̂
[ [
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) − li − r j
]
+
]
, (7)
where to get the last inequality we ignored some non negative terms
[
v̂e (t ) − li − r j
]
+
in the pre-
vious summation and counted only the edges between i < X
L
(v) and j < X
R
(v) that appear in
the optimal matching opt(̂v). To conclude the proof we will use the following simple fact about
function [·]+.
Fact 3.1. E[[s]+] ≥ [E[s]]+ for any real random variables s .
Before we continue with the lower bound of (RHS) (7), we observe that
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) − li − r j
]
+
=[ (
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) − li − r j
)
· I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
]
+
=
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) −
(
li + r j
)
· I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
]
+
for any fixed vertices i ∈ L, j ∈ R,
and valuation profile v̂. Indeed, by definition χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) = 0 and, therefore,
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) − li − r j
]
+
= 0
whenever indicator I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
= 0. Finally, we obtain the required lower bound on the (RHS) of (7).
Surplus ≥ RHS(7) = E
v

∑
i<X
L
(v),
j<X
R
(v)
E
v̂
[ [ (
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) − li − r j
)
· I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
]
+
]
≥ E
v

∑
i<X
L
(v),
j<X
R
(v)
[
E
v̂
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v)
]
− (li + r j ) · E
v̂
[
I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
] ]+
,
where the last inequality follows from Fact 3.1 applied to random variable s1 − s2, where s1
def
=
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) and s2
def
=
(
li + r j
)
· I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
so that Ev̂[[s1 − s2]
+] ≥ [Ev̂[s1 − s2]]
+
= [Ev̂[s1] − Ev̂[s2]]
+. 
3.2 Optimization of V-add(l, r) parameters.
The V-add policy has two variable parameters l, r representing the prices on the vertices in the left
and right parts of G . One needs carefully choose these parameters to compete with the prophet.
The standard approach in the prior work on prophet inequalities is to explicitly set the thresholds
based on certain statistics of each element’s marginal contribution to the optimal solution (usually
a constant fraction of the expectation, or sometimes the median of its distribution). We take a
different approach by casting our problem into a linear algebraic form and then implicitly choosing
parameters l, r that would maximize the bound in this formulation. In this section we derive this
formulation and show how an implicitly described (via certain semi-linear equation) solution to
this problem yields a 3-approximation to the prophet’s expected value. Furthermore, we give a
gradient-decent type algorithm that efficiently calculates vectors l, r up to any given precision
error in the following section.
Our linear algebraic formulation is based on the lower bounds (2) and (5) for the revenue and
surplus terms of the vertex-additive policy V-add(l, r). Namely, the expected value of the V-add(l, r)
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is at least the sum of the right hand sides in (2) and in (5)
E
v
[V-add(l, r)] ≥ E
v

∑
i ∈X
L
(v)
li +
∑
j∈X
R
(v)
r j +
∑
i<X
L
(v)
j<X
R
(v)
[
E
v̂
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v)
]
− (li + r j ) E
v̂
[
I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
] ]+
. (8)
We note that RHS of (8) is calculated in expectation over all valuation profiles v ∼ F , which only
determines the sets X
L
(v) and X
R
(v). We further relax the bound in RHS of (8) by letting the sets
X
L
(v) ,X
R
(v) to be selected by an adversary who wants to minimize our performance guarantee. Let
the worst-case sets be S
L
⊆ L for X
L
(v) and S
R
⊆ R for X
R
(v). Hence,
E
v
[V-add(l, r)] ≥ min
S
L
,S
R
©­­­­«
∑
i ∈S
L
li +
∑
j∈S
R
r j +
∑
i<S
L
j<S
R
[
E
v̂
[
χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v)
]
− (li + r j ) E
v̂
[
I
(i, j)
opt(̂v)
] ]+ª®®®®¬
. (9)
We rewrite RHS of (9) by introducing two n ×m matrices M and Q that respectively comprise
expected contributions and selection probabilities to the optimal matching of the edges between
all pairs of vertices i ∈ L and j ∈ R. Formally,
M
def
=

.
.
.
· · · E
v
[χ
(i, j)
opt
(v)] · · ·
.
.
.
 i, j∈[n×m]
Q
def
=

.
.
.
· · · Pr
v
[(i, j) ∈ opt(v)] · · ·
.
.
.
 i, j∈[n×m]
(10)
Thus lower bound (9) can be written as
E
v
[V-add(l, r)] ≥ min
S
L
,S
R
©­­­­«
∑
i ∈S
L
li +
∑
j∈S
R
r j +
∑
i<S
L
j<S
R
[
Mi, j − (li + r j ) ·Qi, j
]
+
ª®®®®¬
. (11)
On the other hand, the expected value of the optimal matching opt achieved by the prophet ac-
cording to the definitions of matrix M and random variables χ
(i, j)
opt (̂v) (see (10),(4)) is equal to
opt = 1⊤
L
·M · 1
R
, (12)
where 1
L
,1
R
are n andm dimensional vectors with all coordinates equal to 1.
NowRHS of (11) can be rewritten using linear algebraic notations. To this endwe change vectors
l, r to diagonal n × n andm ×m matrices L,R, and represent sets S
L
, and S
R
respectively as vectors
α ∈ Rn , β ∈ Rm with
L
def
= diag(l), R
def
= diag(r), α [i]
def
=
{
1 if i ∈ S
L
,
0 if i < S
L
β[j]
def
=
{
1 if j ∈ S
R
,
0 if j < S
R
.
(13)
With these notations at hand, RHS of (11) is equal to
min
α ∈{0,1}n
β ∈{0,1}m
(
α⊤ · L · 1
L
+ 1
⊤
R
· R · β + (1
L
− α )⊤ · [M − L · Q − Q · R]+ · (1
R
− β)
)
, (14)
where [A]+ is a matrix operator that changes each (i, j) entry of the matrix A
def
= M − L · Q −
Q · R to [A[i, j]]+ = max{0,A[i, j]}. Our optimization problem is to find vertex prices l, r so as to
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maximize expression (14) with diagonal matrices L = diag(l),R = diag(r). Now we can state our
main approximation guarantee.
Theorem 3.1. There are vertex prices l, r such that vertex-additive policy V-add(l, r) ≥
opt
3 .
Proof. Wewill find non negative price vectors l, r, s.t. (14) ≥
opt
3 for L = diag(l),R = diag(r). Let
A+
def
= [A]+ = [M − L · Q − Q · R]+. We view the linear algebraic expression under minimization
in (14) as a bilinear function ofα , β and rewrite it as a separate sum of constant, linear, and bilinear
terms.
(14) = min
α ,β
(
1
⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
− α⊤ ·
[
A+ · 1
R
− L · 1
L
]
−
[
1
⊤
L
· A+ − 1⊤
R
· R
]
· β + α⊤ · A+ · β
)
≥ min
α ,β
(
1
⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
− α⊤ ·
[
A+ · 1
R
− L · 1
L
]
−
[
1
⊤
L
· A+ − 1⊤
R
· R
]
· β
)
, (15)
where the last inequality holds, since α⊤ ·A+ · β ≥ 0 for any choice of α , β vectors (recall that all
entries in the matrix A+ and vectorsα , β are non negative). The latter relaxation (15) of the bound
(14) allows us to simplify the problem so that it can be solved optimally. It turns out that the optimal
solution that maximizes RHS of (15) satisfies the following system of semi-linear equations (it is
not linear, since matrix A+ has a non linear dependency, e.g., on L due to [·]+ operator).{
A+ · 1
R
= L · 1
L
1
⊤
L
· A+ = 1⊤
R
· R.
(16)
We note that if (16) holds, then RHS of (15) is independent of α , β and is equal to 1⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
.
For the remainder of the Theorem 3.1’s proof, we shall assume that the system of equations (16)
has a solution and prove the required bound on the expected value of the prophet, opt. We give an
algorithmic proof for the existence of the solution to (16) in the next section6.
We observe that by the definition of matrixQ as the probability matrix for the optimal matching
to have each edge (i, j) (see (10)) the following vector inequalities in Fact 3.2 are true.
Fact 3.2. 1
L
 Q · 1
R
and 1⊤
R
 1⊤
L
· Q, where  stands for coordinate-wise inequality ≥.
Finally, we show that expression (14) is at least 13opt of the prophet’s expected value.
3 · (14) ≥ 3 · 1⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
= 1
⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
+ 1
⊤
L
· L · 1
L
+ 1
⊤
R
· R · 1
R
≥ 1⊤
L
· A+ · 1
R
+ 1
⊤
L
· L ·
(
Q · 1
R
)
+
(
1
⊤
L
· Q
)
· R · 1
R
= 1
⊤
L
· (A+ + L · Q + Q · R) · 1
R
≥ 1⊤
L
·M · 1
R
= opt,
where the first inequality and the first equality directly follow from (16) and (15); to get the second
inequalitywe observe that all entries in L,R,1
R
, and1
L
are non negative and also use the Fact 3.2; to
get the last inequality, we notice that matrices A+, L,R,Q and vectors 1
R
,1
L
are comprised of non
negative entries, and observe that since A+ = [M − L · Q − Q · R]+, n×mmatrix (A++L ·Q+Q ·R)
dominates n ×m matrix M in every entry; the last equality is (12). 
3.3 Algorithmic solution to the system of semi-linear equations (16)
In this section, we describe a gradient decent type algorithm that solves system of equations (16) up
to an arbitrary precision error ε in polynomial in n,m, and log(ε−1) time. We start by rewriting (16)
6We do no provide a proof for the optimality of L, R that satisfy (16), as it is not needed for any of our results.
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as a system of equations in l = (l1, . . . , ln) and r = (r1, . . . , rm) variables.
li =
m∑
j=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j(li + r j )
]
+
∀i ∈ [n],
r j =
n∑
i=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j (li + r j )
]
+
∀j ∈ [m].
(17)
Our algorithm iteratively updates the solution of l, r to (17) reducing the total additive approxima-
tion error in every such iteration. Specifically, we look at each separate equation in (17) and write
their approximation errors in two vectors δ
L
∈ Rn ,δ
R
∈ Rm .
δ
L
[i]
def
= li −
m∑
j=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j (li + r j )
]
+
δ
R
[j]
def
= r j −
n∑
i=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j (li + r j )
]
+
. (18)
The update rule for l, r in our iterative procedure is quite simple: we choose one of l or r vec-
tors with the larger L1-norm error in (18) and then correct this vector by subtracting half of its
error vector. The description of our update rule for l, r is summarized in Algorithm 1 below. The
initialization of l and r vectors can be arbitrary, e.g., one can set both l, r to be 0-vectors.
Input: Matrices (Mi, j ,Qi, j )i, j∈[n]×[m] of non negative real numbers, error ε > 0.
Output: Vectors l, r solving (17) up to total additive error ε .
1 repeat
2 if
δ
L

1
≥
δ
R

1
then
3 update vector l ←
(
l − 12 · δL
)
4 end
5 else
6 update vector r ←
(
r − 12 · δR
)
7 end
8 Update δ
L
,δ
R
according to (18) with new l, r.
9 until
δ
L

1
+
δ
R

1
≤ ε ;
Algorithm 1: Iterative update algorithm solving system of equations (17).
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm 1 terminates inO
(
log(ε−1) + log
(∑
i, j Mi, j
) )
many steps. Moreover, the
obtained solution is within O (ε) L1-distance to an exact solution of (17).
Proof. First, we show that our algorithm decreases the total L1-norm of the combined errorδ
L

1
+
δ
R

1
in all iterations and thus converges to the solution of (17). Specifically, we show a
constant fraction decrement in L1-norm of the total error in each iteration.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that
δ
L

1
≥
δ
R

1
in a given iteration and thus we
update l vector to a new value l̂
def
= l − 12 · δL in this iteration with the respective new errors
δ̂
L
(̂l, r), δ̂
R
(̂l, r) given by formula (18) for the updated l ← l̂, r ← r vectors. Let us bound first the
decrease in the L1-norm of the error
δ̂
L

1
compared to its previous value
δ
L

1
.
δ̂
L
[i] = l̂i −
m∑
j=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(̂
li + r j
)]+
= li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] −
m∑
j=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] + r j
)]
+
= δ
L
[i] −
1
2
δ
L
[i] −
m∑
j=1
([
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] + r j
)]
+
−
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li + r j
)]
+
)
,
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where to get the last equality we simply plugged in the definition of δ
L
[i] from (18). We let
di, j
def
=
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] + r j
)]
+
−
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li + r j
)]
+
(19)
Hence, δ̂
L
[i] = δ
L
[i]− 12δL [i]−
∑m
j=1 di, j for every i ∈ [n].We notice thatdi, j =
[
Ai, j +
1
2Qi, j · δL [i]
]
+
−[
Ai, j
]
+
, where Ai, j
def
= Mi, j − Qi, j
(
li + r j
)
as per our definition of matrix A. Now, the function
[·]+ satisfies the following two simple properties: (i) [x + y]+ − [x]+ has the same sign as y; (ii)[x + y]+ − [x]+ ≤ y for any real numbers x ,y. Thus all di, j for every j ∈ [m] have the same sign
as δ
L
[i] (property (i) for Ai, j and
1
2Qi, j · δL [i]). Moreover, by the second property m∑
j=1
di, j
 = m∑
j=1
di, j  ≤ m∑
j=1
12Qi, j · δL [i] ≤ 12 δL [i] ,
where the last inequality holds since
∑
j Qi, j ≤ 1 as the sum of the row entries in the matching
probability matrix Q. Therefore, we haveδ̂
L
[i]
 = δL [i] − 12δL [i] − m∑
j=1
di, j
 = δL [i] −
(
1
2
δ
L
[i]
 + m∑
j=1
di, j ) .
We obtain a bound on the decrease of L1-norm of δ̂L by adding previous equation over all i ∈ [n].δ̂
L

1
−
δ
L

1
=
n∑
i=1
(δ̂
L
[i]
 − δ
L
[i]
) = − n∑
i=1
1
2
δ
L
[i]
 − n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
di, j  . (20)
Next we bound the increase in the L1-norm of error δ̂R compared to
δ
R

1
. We note that
δ̂
R
[j] = r j −
n∑
i=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(̂
li + r j
)]
+
= r j −
n∑
i=1
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] + r j
)]
+
= δ
R
[j] −
n∑
i=1
([
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li −
1
2
δ
L
[i] + r j
)]
+
−
[
Mi, j −Qi, j
(
li + r j
)]
+
)
,
for every j ∈ [m]. Thus δ̂
R
[j] = δ
R
[j] −
∑n
i=1 di, j and we getδ̂
R

1
−
δ
R

1
=
m∑
j=1
(δ̂
R
[j]
 − δ
R
[j]
) = m∑
j=1
(δR [j] − n∑
i=1
di, j
 − δR [j]
)
≤
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
di, j  . (21)
Finally, we combine bounds (20) and (21) to show constant factor drop in L1-norm of errors δ̂L , δ̂R .δ̂
L

1
+
δ̂
R

1
−
δ
L

1
−
δ
R

1
=
(δ̂
L

1
−
δ
L

1
)
+
(δ̂
R

1
−
δ
R

1
)
≤ −
∑
i
1
2
δ
L
[i]
 −∑
i, j
di, j  +∑
i, j
di, j  = −1
2
δ
L

1
≤ −
1
4
(δ
L

1
+
δ
R

1
)
,
where the last inequality holds because we assumed
δ
L

1
≥
δ
R

1
. That means that the L1-norm
of the combined error decreases by a factor of 34 in every round and after t steps the L1-norm
of the combined error (δ
L
(t),δ
R
(t)) will be
δ
L
(t)

1
+
δ
R
(t)

1
≤ ( 34 )
t (
δ
L
(0)

1
+
δ
R
(0)

1
), whereδ
L
(0)

1
=
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1Mi, j =
δ
R
(0)

1
. ThusAlgorithm1 terminates inO
(
log(ε−1) + log
(∑
i, j Mi, j
) )
steps. Furthermore, if we let the Algorithm 1 to continue indefinitely, it will produce a sequence
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of states st
def
= (l(t), r(t)) ∈ Rn+m for each iteration t that converges to an exact solution of (17) as
t → +∞. Indeed, we can show that st is a Cauchy sequence, i.e., for any t2 > t1 ≥ T we havest2 − st11 ≤ +∞∑
t=T
‖st − st+1‖1 ≤
+∞∑
t=T
( δ
L
(t)

1
2
+
δ
R
(t)

1
2
)
≤
+∞∑
t=T
ε
2
·
(
3
4
)t−T
= O (ε) ,
since ‖st − st+1‖1 =
1
2 max
( δ
L
(t)

1
,
δ
R
(t)

1
)
for any t and
δ
L
(t)

1
+
δ
R
(t)

1
≤ ( 34 )
t−T (
δ
L
(T )

1
+δ
R
(T )

1
) ≤ ( 34 )
t−T · ε for any t ≥ T . As Rn+m is a complete space, the Cauchy sequence (st )
∞
t=0 has
a limit s ∈ Rn+m which must be an exact solution to (17) as the combined error
(
δ
L
(t),δ
R
(t)
)
goes
to 0 with t → +∞. The last equation also shows that the result sT = (l(T ), r(T )) of Algorithm 1 is
within an O (ε) distance from the exact solution s. 
4 LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove a lower bound of 2.25. We construct a sequence of bipartite graphs
Gn(L,R, E)with L = R = [3n] such that the ratio between offline and online optimum converges to
2.25 as n goes to infinity. Edges of graphGn arrive in three consecutive batches: first arrive edges
of E1, then E2, then E3. The distributions of edge values in the groups E1, E2, and E3 are as follows.
E1 = {(i, i + n)|i ∈ [n]} ∪ {(j + n, j)|j ∈ [n]} ve =
1/2
E2 = {(i, i + 2n)|i ∈ [n]} ∪ {(j + 2n, j)|j ∈ [n]} {Pr
[
ve =
3/4
]
= 0.5, Pr [ve = 0] = 0.5}
E3 = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ [n]} {Pr [ve = n] =
1/n2 , Pr [ve = 0] = 1 −
1/n2 }
The idea is that the online algorithm needs to decide whether to take edges with guaranteed low
value of 1/2 from E1 without seeing the realization of the future edges, then the online algorithm
receives middle value edges ve =
3/4 from E2 with probability 0.5 each edge without knowing
which large value rare edges ve = n from E3 will arrive at the end. The optimum offline solution
should take as many large edges from E3 with ve = n as possible, then it matches each edge from
E2 with ve =
3/4 (if i ∈ [n] or j ∈ [n] was not covered by an edge from E3), and finally match all
unmatched vertices i, j ∈ [n] using low value edges E1. We write an upper bound on the expected
offline optimum opt as follows
opt = n
∑
i, j∈[n]
Pr [(i, j) ∈ opt(v)] +
∑
i ∈[n]
(
3
4
Pr [(i, i + 2n) ∈ opt(v)] +
1
2
Pr [(i, i + n) ∈ opt(v)]
)
+
∑
j∈[n]
(
3
4
Pr [(j + 2n, j) ∈ opt(v)] +
1
2
Pr [(j + n, j) ∈ opt(v)]
)
(22)
For the first term corresponding to the large edges e ∈ E3 in opt(v) we have
n
∑
i, j∈[n]
Pr [(i, j) ∈ opt(v)] ≥ n
∑
i, j
Pr
[
v(i, j) = n
]
·Pr [∀e ∈ E3 s.t. e , (i, j), e ∩ (i, j) , ∅ : ve = 0]
≥ n · n2 ·
1
n2
·
(
1 −
2n − 2
n2
)
= n −O(1), (23)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that opt(v) must include every large edge v(i, j) = n
that does not share a vertex i or j with any other large edge ve = n; to get the second inequality
we apply union bound to the edges e ∈ E3 that share a vertex with (i, j). For the second term we
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get∑
i ∈[n]
(
3
4
Pr [(i, i + 2n) ∈ opt(v)] +
1
2
Pr [(i, i + n) ∈ opt(v)]
)
=
∑
i ∈[n]
Pr [∀j ∈ [n] (i, j) < opt(v)] ·(
3
4
Pr
[
v(i,i+2n) =
3
4
]
+
1
2
Pr
[
v(i,i+2n) = 0
])
≥ n ·
(
1 −
n
n2
)
·
(
3
4
·
1
2
+
1
2
·
1
2
)
=
5
8
n −O(1), (24)
where the first equality holds, as the prophet should take (i, i + 2n) with v(i,i+2n) =
3
4 if i is not
covered by the edges of E3 in opt(v); to get the first inequality we use union bound for n edges
(i,k) ∈ E3. We get the same bound as (24) for the third term in (22). We combine lower bound (23),
and two lower bounds (24) to get
opt ≥
9
4
n −O(1) (25)
Now, we derive a lower bound on the expected payoff of any online algorithm A. First, notice
that there is no randomness in the values of the edges e ∈ E1. Thus we can assume without loss
of generality thatA chooses some fixed number of edges from E1. Then the algorithm picks some
random number of edges Y from the second group E2, and finally takes a random number X of
edges from the third group E3:
z
def
= |{e ∈ E1 |e < A(v)}| Y
def
= |{e ∈ E2 |e ∈ A(v)}| X
def
= |{e ∈ E3 |e ∈ A(v)}|
Then the expected payoff of the algorithm is as follows
E

∑
e ∈A(v)
ve
 =
1
2
· (2n − z) +
3
4
· E [Y] + n · E [X] . (26)
First, we get an upper bound on E[X] via Y and z. Indeed, if z
L
, z
R
are the number of vertices not
covered by A in the left i ∈ [n] and the right j ∈ [n] sides of Gn after arrival of E1 edges and
Y
L
,Y
R
are the number of E2 edges taken byA of the form (i, i + 2n), (j + 2n, j), respectively, then
E [X] ≤
∑
i, j∈[n]
Pr
[
v(i, j) = n
]
· I(i, j not covered) =
1
n2
·
(
z
L
− Y
L
) (
z
R
− Y
R
)
≤
(
z − Y
2n
)2
,
where the last inequality holds since z = z
L
+ z
R
and Y = Y
L
+ Y
R
. We continue with the upper
bound on the expected payoff (26) as follows
E

∑
e ∈A(v)
ve
 ≤ n −
z
2
+ E
[
3
4
Y + n
(
z − Y
2n
)2]
= n
2n∑
y=0
(
1 −
1
2
z
n
+
3
4
y
n
+
z2 − 2yz + y2
4n2
)
Pr [Y = y] = n
2n∑
y=0
f
(y
n
,
z
n
)
Pr [Y = y] , (27)
where f (β,γ )
def
= 1 −
γ
2 +
3β
4 +
(γ−β )2
4 for γ =
z
n and β =
y
n with 0 ≤ β ≤ γ ≤ 2, as 0 ≤ Y ≤ z ≤ 2n.
We observe that the random variable Y is stochastically dominated by Bernoulli( 12 , z), since A
should not take the edges e ∈ E2 with ve = 0 (A may or may not take ve =
3
4 ). Therefore, we have
by Chebyshev’s inequality
Pr
[
Y
n
≥
z
2n
+
n3/4
n
]
≤ Pry∼Bernoulli( 1
2
,z)
[
y
n
≥
E[y]
n
+
n3/4
n
]
= o(1) as n → +∞
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We note that f (β,γ ) ≤ 3 is bounded for all values of z and y in the support of Y. We plug this and
Chebyshev’s bound in (27) and get
E

∑
e ∈A(v)
ve
 ≤ n
z
2
+n3/4∑
y=0
f
(y
n
,
z
n
)
Pr [Y = y] + n · 3 · o(1). (28)
We have
y
n
− z2n = β −
γ
2 ≤ o(1) for all y in the summation range of RHS(28) (y ≤
z
2 + n
3/4). One
can rewrite f (β,γ ) as follows
f (β,γ ) = 1 +
(
β −
γ
2
)
︸   ︷︷   ︸
≤o(1)
·
(
3
8
(2 − γ ) +
β
4
)
︸             ︷︷             ︸
1≥ also ≥0
−
γ
16
(2 − γ )︸     ︷︷     ︸
≥0
where γ ≤ 2.
We have f (β,γ ) = 1 + o(1) for any β =
y
n
≤
γ
2 + n
−1/4 where y ≤ z2 + n
3/4. Thus (28) implies
E

∑
e ∈A(v)
ve
 ≤ n
(
1 + o(1)
)
Pr
[
Y ≤ z/2 + n3/4
]
+ n · o(1) ≤ n
(
1 + o(1)
)
.
Therefore, any online algorithm A cannot achieve better guarantee than 94 − o(1) fraction of the
prophet (see (25)) on the series of graphs Gn as n goes to infinity. This gives us a lower bound
summarized in the theorem below.
Theorem 4.1. For any ε > 0 there is an instance such that no online algorithm has competitive
ratio better than 2.25 − ε against the prophet.
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